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ABSTRACT 
 
An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of 
Married Couples in European Countries*
 
This paper presents an evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in 15 EU 
countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. First, we show that many tax-transfer 
schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the tax rate on 
one person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. This stands in contrast to the 
previous literature on this question, which has focused on a specific form of positive 
jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested 
transfer programs combined with tax systems that usually feature very little jointness. 
Second, we consider the labour supply distortion on secondary earners relative to primary 
earners implied by the current tax-transfer systems, and study the welfare effects of small 
reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. By adopting a small-reform 
methodology, it is possible to set out a simple analysis based on more realistic labour supply 
models than those considered in the existing literature. We present microsimulations showing 
that simple revenue-neutral reforms that lower the tax burden on secondary earners are 
associated with substantial welfare gains in most countries. Finally, we consider the tax-
transfer implications of marriage and estimate the so-called marriage penalty. For most 
countries, we find large marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution driven primarily by 
features of the transfer system. 
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 1. Introduction 
The tax treatment of couples has been a debating point throughout the existence of the income tax. Actual 
policies have varied over time and across countries. Over the past three decades, there has been an 
international trend from joint to individual taxation of husbands and wives, and today the majority of 
OECD countries use the individual as the basic unit of taxation. Under fully individual taxation, tax 
liability is assessed separately for each family member and is therefore independent of the income of other 
individuals living in the household. By contrast, in a system of fully joint taxation of couples, as operated 
by for example the United States, tax liability is assessed at the family level and depends on total family 
income. Three basic points have been noted in previous discussions of the choice between individual and 
joint taxation (e.g. Rosen, 1977; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983; Pechman, 1987). 
The first argument is an efficiency argument. It starts from the empirical observation that the secondary 
earner in a family – typically the wife – tends to have a more elastic labour supply than the primary earner 
(e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). A Ramsey-type optimal tax rule then suggests that the labour income 
of secondary earners should be taxed at a lower rate than the labour income of primary earners. This is 
achieved to a certain degree by a progressive individual income tax, because primary earners have higher 
incomes and therefore face higher marginal tax rates than their spouses. On the other hand, a fully joint 
income tax creates identical marginal tax rates across members of the same household and hence does not 
meet this efficiency criterion. 
The second argument is that tax systems should be neutral with respect to marriage decisions. This can be 
viewed as an efficiency argument that tax systems should not distort the marriage market or as a horizontal 
equity argument that identical couples (married or cohabitating) should be treated identically for tax 
purposes. While individual-based taxation is neutral with respect to marriage, joint tax systems are 
generically non-neutral. Jointness may penalize or subsidize marriage depending on the exact design, and 
the size of penalties/subsidies generally depends on the distribution of income within the family. 
The third argument is an equity argument, taking as its point of departure that welfare is better measured 
by family income than individual income. As a result, two families with the same total income should, 
other things being the same, pay equal taxes. By the same token, if one family receives a higher total 
income than another family, then the first family should face a higher tax liability than the second one. 
This equity criterion is satisfied by a joint income tax that depends on total family income, but not by a 
progressive individual tax system, because in that case tax liability depends also on the distribution of 
incomes within the family. 
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This paper attempts to shed light on the three issues discussed above. We start by noting that these issues 
ultimately pertain to the redistribution scheme as a whole, not just the tax system, and we therefore present 
an integrated treatment of the tax and transfer system. A recurrent theme in the paper is that the transfer 
system is a crucial element in understanding and evaluating redistribution schemes affecting married 
couples. We also point out that the focus in previous discussions on the choice between individual tax 
treatment and joint tax treatment based on family income represents an oversimplification, because real-
world redistribution schemes are almost never fully individual or fully joint. There are two reasons for this. 
First, while most countries have adopted individual filing in the tax system, they tend to retain certain 
elements of jointness such as the transfer of unused allowances across spouses, dependent spouse 
exemptions, etc. Second, significant parts of transfer systems are fully joint, because social benefits are 
means-tested according to the combined income (and often assets) of the two spouses in the household. 
This implies that actual redistribution systems typically combine a form of quasi-individual taxation with 
family-based transfer systems, creating a fairly complicated jointness structure that is different from the 
two polar cases typically analyzed. 
This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in 15 EU 
countries. The analysis has three components. First, we carefully map the nature of jointness in tax-transfer 
schemes in our sample of countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. EUROMOD is built 
around country-specific, but partly harmonized, micro datasets combined with a detailed tax-benefit 
simulator capturing the full set of institutional features of tax and transfer systems in each country.1 We 
find that many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the 
tax rate on one person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. Such a system is opposite to the 
form of jointness typically analyzed in the literature – fully joint and progressive taxation – because such 
schemes feature a positive interaction between tax rates and spousal earnings and therefore positive 
jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested transfers 
combined with individual or almost-individual taxes. To see this, consider a secondary earner, say the wife, 
deciding about labour market entry. If she is married to a low-income husband, the family is in the phase-
out range of transfer programs, and she will face a high effective tax rate. On the other hand, if she is 
married to a high-income husband, the family is beyond the phase-out range of transfer programs, and she 
will face a low effective tax rate because the income tax is individual. Hence, the wife's tax is declining in 
the husband's earnings. 
                                                     
1. An introduction to EUROMOD and a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU countries has 
been provided by Sutherland (2001), Immervoll and O'Donoghue (2003), and Immervoll (2004). 
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 Second, the paper considers the incentives to supply labour for secondary earners relative to primary 
earners implied by the existing tax-transfer systems, and studies the welfare effects of reforms that change 
the relative taxation of spouses. This issue is separate from the nature of jointness discussed above: 
jointness has to do with the relationship between tax rates and spousal earnings (a cross-derivative in the 
tax function), whereas labour supply incentives have to do with the relationship between tax liability and 
own earnings (an own-derivative in the tax function). Previous work has often discussed the two issues as 
if they are one and the same, but we find that the distinction is important in practice. To study the welfare 
effects of tax-transfer reform, the paper starts by setting out a simple theoretical model that incorporates 
only participation responses, and then turn to a general model that allows for both participation and hours-
of-work responses for both spouses in the household. Microsimulations of different revenue-neutral 
reforms that reduce the tax burden on secondary earners show that, for both models and for most countries, 
a lowering of the tax burden on secondary earners is associated with substantial welfare gains. 
This part of the paper may be seen as an extension of our previous work based on single-person households 
(Immervoll et al., 2007) to the case of two-person households. It is also related to the recent work by 
Alesina and Ichino (2007), arguing that tax schemes should be gender-specific with lower rates on females. 
We do not consider gender-specific taxation as such (consistent with real-world tax systems that are 
anonymous and hence gender-blind), but consider reforms that change the taxation of primary versus 
secondary earners. We define primary versus secondary, not in terms of gender, but in terms of relative 
earnings within the family – a concept that is correlated with gender.2 Indeed, it is shown that in almost all 
countries more than 80% of secondary earners are women, and in some countries more than 90% of 
secondary earners are women. Thus, the reforms under consideration strongly target married women with 
low earnings or weak labour market attachment without formally discriminating based on gender. This is 
important because gender-specific taxation per se would raise difficult legal or constitutional issues in 
many countries. 
Third, the paper explores the distortions in the decision to marry by simulating the size of marriage 
penalties resulting from the combined effect of taxes and transfers. The presence of family-based and 
means-tested transfers penalizes marriage at the bottom of the distribution, implying that marriage 
penalties at the bottom tend to go hand in hand with negative jointness.3 Indeed, we find large marriage 
penalties at the bottom of the distribution (but not at the top) in most countries, which raises important 
                                                     
2. More specifically, the lower-earning spouse in each family is defined as the secondary earner. For one-
earner couples, this obviously implies that the non-working spouse is the secondary earner. 
3. However, theoretically it is entirely possible to design a negatively joint tax system that subsidizes rather 
than penalizes marriage. 
 8
  
questions pertaining to fairness as well as to efficiency. Transfers and taxes that depend on marriage are 
often accused by conservatives of destroying the traditional two-parent family and leading to high rates of 
single motherhood. Although empirical studies of the effects on marriage and divorce from income taxes 
(e.g. Alm and Whittington, 1997, 1999), welfare benefits (e.g. Hoynes 1997a,b; Moffitt, 1998), or taxes 
and benefits combined (Dickert-Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b) tend to find modest or no effects, 
the existence of marriage disincentives continues to be a controversial point of contention. 
Most of the literature studying the optimal design of tax and transfer programs and the evaluation of tax 
and welfare reform rests on models of single-person households. However, real-world tax-transfer schemes 
for a large part redistribute income across families formed around couples, creating a substantial gap 
between theory and practice. This has triggered a recent and growing interest in generalizing the theory of 
optimal income redistribution to explicitly deal with couples. For example, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 
(2007, 2008) explore the optimal nonlinear taxation of couples as a multi-dimensional screening problem, 
whereby agents (couples) are characterized by a multi-dimensional parameter (ability and taste-for-work 
parameters of each spouse) that are unobserved by the principal (the government which maximizes social 
welfare). They find that, under certain assumptions, optimal incentive schemes feature negative jointness, 
which is consistent with our findings for Europe. Recent papers by Brett (2006) and Cremer, Lozachmeur 
and Pestieau (2006) also analyze the optimal taxation of couples as a multidimensional screening problem. 
The rest of the literature (e.g. Schroyen, 2003; Alesina and Ichino, 2007) typically restricts the tax function 
to be separable (albeit gender-specific), thereby sidestepping the complexities associated with multi-
dimensional screening. 
Our paper may be seen as an applied counterpart to these recent theoretical papers. By focusing on small 
reforms rather than the optimal system, we are able to set out a tractable analysis based on more general 
and realistic labour supply models than the very stylized models previously considered. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the EUROMOD model. Section 3 maps 
out the existing tax-transfer treatment of married couples in our sample of European countries. Section 4 
sets out a joint labour supply model to evaluate reforms affecting married couples, and presents a 
microsimulation study of specific reforms that reduce the tax burden on second-earner participation. 
Section 5 studies marriage penalties, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data 
Our data source is EUROMOD, a microsimulation model for the EU built around partly homogenized 
micro datasets that include data on earnings, labour force participation and demographics. The version 
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 available for this study relates to 1998 and covers the 15 countries that constituted the EU at that time. 
Based on detailed algorithms capturing the full range of institutional features of tax and transfer systems in 
each country, the model is able to compute a wide range of taxes and benefits for each observation unit in 
representative samples for the various countries. The main policy instruments incorporated in EUROMOD 
are income taxes, social security contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees, benefit recipients, and 
employers as well as universal and means-tested social benefits including housing assistance.4 The model 
fully accounts for the complicated interaction of different types of taxes and benefits with earnings, assets, 
employment status, marital status, housing situation and children, and its considerable level of detail makes 
it an ideal tool for comparative tax analysis.5
We restrict the sample to married couples where both husband and wife are between 16 and 64 years of 
age, where the couple as a whole reports positive annual earnings, and where at least one member of the 
household has been working the entire year. We exclude those who are currently receiving pension, early 
retirement, or disability benefits. In each couple, we define the primary earner (PE) as the highest-earning 
member and the secondary earner (SE) as the lowest-earnings member of the household. Together with our 
sample restriction, this implies that, in one-earner couples, the primary earner works the entire year while 
the secondary earner is non-employed throughout the year. In two-earner couples, the secondary earner 
works either part of or the entire year but always has relatively low earnings. 
While we feel that it makes sense to define primary versus secondary earner in terms of earnings (and 
indirectly labour market participation), the earnings-based definition is in practice highly correlated with a 
gender-based definition. To demonstrate this, Table 1 displays the share of women among secondary 
earners according to our definition. We see that, in one-earner couples, more than 90 percent of secondary 
earners (non-participants) are women in all countries except the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. 
In two-earner couples, the second-earner definition is slightly less skewed towards women, so that on 
average the share of secondary earners that are women varies between 80 and 90 percent across most of the 
15 countries in our sample. The close relationship between relative earnings within families and gender 
implies that a purely earnings-based couple tax function can be targeted to gender without being formally 
                                                     
4. In the results reported here, we do not include unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the calculation of 
effective participation tax rates. This is due in part to difficulties associated with accounting properly for 
the implications of limited UI duration in our static tax rate measures. At a more conceptual level, it is 
likely that UI schemes providing insurance against involuntary and temporary job loss have very different 
incentive implications than poverty alleviation programs offering permanent income guarantees to all non-
workers. 
5. For further information on EUROMOD, the reader is referred to Sutherland (2001) as well as the Internet 
at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod 
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gender-based, avoiding discrimination based on a birth characteristic and the legal-constitutional issues this 
would raise.6
3. The Tax-Transfer Treatment of Couples in Europe 
Based on EUROMOD, this section maps out the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in our sample of 
European countries. As general background, Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix summarize the most 
important institutional features of tax and benefit systems affecting married couples in each country. 
It is useful to start by distinguishing between two different properties of a tax-transfer schedule for 
couples: (i) the relative tax rates on husbands and wives, and (ii) the jointness of the schedule. In most of 
the existing literature, these two properties have been studied as if they are one and the same, with joint 
taxation being defined as a situation with identical marginal tax rates on the two spouses and individual 
taxation being defined as a situation with a higher marginal tax rate on the primary earner. However, this 
close relationship between relative tax rates and jointness is present only under very strong restrictions on 
the tax schedule. In general, jointness is related to the cross-relationship between tax rates and spousal 
earnings (a cross-derivative in the tax function), whereas tax rates reflect the relationship between tax 
liability and own earnings (an own-derivative in the tax function). In principle and in practice, it is entirely 
possible to combine forms of jointness with, say, lower tax rates on secondary earners. 
To make the discussion precise, it is helpful to define the tax function for couples as ( )sp zzT , , where  
denotes primary earnings and  denotes secondary earnings. Below we often refer to this as a `tax 
function', but we want to think of  as the net payment by a couple to the government embodying taxes 
as well as transfers. The effective marginal tax rates (including benefit phase-out) of the two spouses are 
given by 
pz
sz
( ).T
( )spp zzT ,′  and ( )sps zzT ,′ , and they are of course important for determining hours worked for 
those who are working (the intensive margin of labour supply). Marginal tax rates are shown in Table A3 
in the appendix, but this section focuses instead on a different tax rate measure – the participation tax rate. 
This is a more interesting tax rate measure because the extensive margin of labour supply is empirically 
more important. We define the participation tax rate on a particular family member as the total change in 
 as this family member enters into employment as a share of earnings generated by the entry. In order 
to calculate participation tax rates, one has to make assumptions about the sequence of participation 
( ).T
                                                     
6. Despite the economic equivalence between gender-based taxation and affirmative action (which has been 
approved by the courts on many occasions), the two policies would be viewed very differently by the 
courts. See Rubenfeld (1997) for a discussion of this point in the context of race. 
 11
 choices within the household because, with jointness in the tax-transfer code, the tax liability change 
associated with a person entering depends on whether the spouse is working or not. We make the natural 
assumption that the primary earner enters first and the secondary earner enters second. In Section sec-
reform theory, we provide a microfoundation for this model, which has been adopted in many empirical 
labour supply studies (e.g. Eissa, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). 
Under the assumed sequence of labour market entries in the household, the participation tax rates on the 
primary and secondary earners are given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.
0,,
    ,
0,00,
s
psp
s
p
p
p z
zTzzT
z
TzT −≡−≡ ττ       (1) 
These tax rates are simulated by EUROMOD in the following way. For the computation of sτ , we 
consider the subsample of two-earner couples and start by computing actual taxes net of transfers 
( )sp zzT ,  at each observed earnings pair, accounting for other relevant household information (place of 
residence, number of kids, etc.). We then recompute taxes and transfers in the alternative (hypothetical) 
situation where the secondary earner does not work, ( )0,pzT , and calculate sτ  as in eq. (1). Analogously 
for pτ , we use the sample of one-earner couples to simulate taxes net of transfers in the original situation, 
( )0,pzT , and in the alternative situation where the primary earner is not working, , and then apply 
formula (participation tax rates).
( 0,0T )
                                                     
7
Table 2 shows participation tax rates and labour market outcomes for primary and secondary earners in 
each country (averages for each country sample). As one would expect, Scandinavia and Northern-
Continental Europe feature higher overall tax rate levels than Anglo-Saxon and Southern European 
countries. More interestingly, the tax rate on primary earners is higher than on secondary earners in all but 
the four Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). This is a result of the impact of 
family-based and means-tested welfare benefits, which are affected more by the first than by the second 
entrant. We do not observe the same effect in Southern Europe where welfare benefits are less generous. 
7. Our tax-rate estimates are therefore calculated for those currently working. As a result of sample selection, 
one would expect tax rates to be different for non-working individuals considering a transition into work. 
As we do not observe the earnings potential of non-working individuals, calculating their participation tax 
rates would require jointly estimating a wage and participation model for couples. In the microsimulation 
exercise in Section 4, we deal with the selection issue indirectly by considering a decreasing profile of 
participation elasticities such that new labour market entrants tend to be located at the bottom end of the 
income distribution. 
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Although most countries impose a higher participation tax rate on the primary earner, there are substantial 
differences in the relative rates across countries. In particular, the UK system stands out by being much 
more favourable to second-earner participation than all other countries. 
The ratio of the primary-earner tax rate to the secondary-earner tax rate is interesting because it can be 
compared to optimal tax rules expressing relative tax rates as a function of elasticities (e.g. Boskin and 
Sheshinski, 1983; Kleven and Kreiner, 2006). In the special case of separability in utility of spousal labour 
supplies, the optimal tax rate on each spouse is given by an inverse elasticity rule and the optimal relative 
tax rate sp ττ /  is therefore given by the participation elasticity of the secondary earner relative to the 
primary earner. This implies that the tax ratios in the table can be seen as critical values for relative 
participation elasticities. For example, in the United Kingdom, if the second-earner elasticity is more than 
2.79 times as high as the primary earner elasticity, it would be efficient to shift some of the tax burden 
from secondary earners to primary earners. In view of the evidence on the responsiveness of labour force 
participation of married women, the table seems to suggest that in many countries the relative tax rate on 
secondary earners is inefficiently high. We return to this issue in Section 4. 
Finally, the table shows that both participation and earnings (conditional on participation) tend to be 
strongly skewed in favour of primary earners in most countries. Although the countries we consider differ 
along many dimensions (besides tax rates) that may have direct implications for labour market outcomes, it 
is interesting that the cross-country variation in relative participation is roughly consistent with the 
variation in relative participation taxes. For example, Southern European countries are characterized by 
lower participation taxes along with higher participation rates for primary relative to secondary earners 
compared to most other countries. At the other end of the spectrum, Denmark, Finland, and the UK are 
associated with higher relative tax rates and lower relative participation for primary earners. 
Let us now consider the jointness of the couple tax function ( )sp zzT ,  and therefore the cross-derivative 
 . One benchmark case is that of fully individual taxation, i.e. ′′psT ( ) ( ) ( )ssppsp zTzTzzT +=, , which is 
associated with a zero cross-derivative  . In practice, the functional forms  and  would 
typically be the same, in which case we have a so-called 
0=′′psT ( ).pT ( ).sT
anonymous individual tax. Another benchmark 
case is the fully joint couple tax ( )sp zzT +  as adopted in the United States and in some European 
countries (see Table A1). If the system additionally features a progressive marginal tax rate structure ( 
 ), the couple tax would be associated with a positive cross-derivative  . More generally, 
there is a whole range of joint couple tax functions 
0>′′T 0>′′psT
( )sp zzT ,  with  . Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 0≠′′psT
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 (2007) define positive jointness as a system where the tax on one person depends positively on spousal 
earnings (  ), and 0>′′psT negative jointness as a system where the tax on each partner depends negatively 
on spousal earnings (  ). Because a fully joint schedule is associated with positive jointness, 
individual taxation can be seen as an intermediate (rather than polar) case in between full jointness and 
negative jointness. This is interesting because we show below that many real-world schedules feature 
negative jointness, implying that they have moved further away from fully joint taxation than the 
individual system. 
0<′′psT
The above definitions of jointness are stated in terms of cross-derivatives of marginal tax rates. Consistent 
with the analysis of tax rate levels, we will state a definition of jointness in terms of participation tax rates. 
In particular, we say that a system is positively joint if 0>∂∂ pszτ , negatively joint if 0<∂∂ pszτ , and separate if 
0=∂∂ pszτ  . While the definitions of jointness in terms of marginal tax rates are local, the definitions in terms 
of participation (`average') tax rates reflect that a tax schedule is joint on average over a range of incomes. 
Before turning to the empirical results, it is helpful for a moment to separate the tax and transfer system. 
Denote by ( )sp zzt ,  the tax payment and by ( )sp zzb ,  the benefit payment, so that 
( ) ( ) ( )spspsp zzbzztzzT ,,, −=  . Consider then a tax-transfer scheme that combines an individual income 
tax and a fully joint transfer system, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )spssppsp zzbztztzzT +−+=,  . The definition in eq. (1) 
then implies ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ssppsss zzzbzbzt /+−+=τ  . Means-testing corresponds to 
( ) ( ) 0≥+− spp zzbzb , which creates an extra tax on second-earner participation. However, as zp  
increases, the family is pushed beyond the phase-out range of the various transfer programs (at any given 
zs  ), which tends to lower ( ) ( )spp zzbzb +−  and create a pattern where 0<∂∂ pszτ  at the bottom. This 
explains a pattern we find for many countries. 
For our measurement of jointness, we construct a number of hypothetical households that vary with respect 
to household earnings and the number of children, and apply EUROMOD to calculate effective tax rates 
for these hypothetical families.8 We base this part of the analysis on hypothetical households (instead of 
data on actual households) in order to adequately isolate the interdependence between spouses in the tax-
                                                     
8. Because we are working with hypothetical households, it is necessary to make an assumption about the 
living arrangements of the families. We have chosen to assume that all families reside in rental housing, 
and have then imputed rental costs for all countries. 
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benefit legislation. If we were to use sample data and compare the net-tax burden of actual households at 
different earnings levels, the results would be affected by selection effects.9
To illustrate the jointness in the tax-transfer system, we plot the participation tax rate of married 
individuals at different income levels as a function of the earnings of the spouse.10 We consider married 
individuals at four different income levels: the 5th, 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the earnings 
distribution of secondary earners (denoted below by SEp5, SEp10, SEp50, and SEp90). For each of these 
individual income levels, we calculate the participation tax rate at 20 different earnings levels of the 
spouse, corresponding to the 5th, 10th, 15th,..., 100th percentiles in the earnings distribution of primary 
earners (denoted below by PEp5, PEp10, ..., PEp100). Our results are shown in Figure 1 for families with 
two children. Corresponding graphs for childless couples are provided in Figure A2 in the appendix.11
The most striking result is that most countries display substantial negative jointness at the bottom of the 
income distribution. As explained above, this can be largely attributed to means-tested benefits such as 
social assistance, housing benefits and child benefits that are phased-out as a function of total household 
income.12 Indeed, the high claw-back rates used in many countries tend to generate participation taxes that 
are very high for secondary earners married to low-wage primary earners, often above 70% and sometimes 
close to 100%. 
Countries with negative jointness at low income levels may be divided into two groups depending on the 
pattern at higher income levels. Countries that operate an individual income tax (possibly apart from some 
family-based tax expenditures at the bottom) and/or have a fairly flat tax rate structure at the top tend to 
                                                     
9. For instance, marriage patterns are known to display positive assertative matching, which in itself would 
tend to produce a positive relationship between individual tax rates and spousal earnings. 
10. For completeness, Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates jointness based on marginal tax rates. The 
qualitative results are similar to those presented below, but participation tax rate measures are smoother 
because they reflect average jointness of marginal tax rates over a range of incomes. 
11. When considering a couple with one spouse belonging to the bottom of the earnings distribution for 
primary earners and the other spouse located at the top of the earnings distribution for secondary earners, it 
may actually be the second spouse who has the highest earnings. This is, however, only relevant for the 
lower part of the two grey curves because the earnings of the secondary earners in the data are substantially 
lower than primary earnings. Moreover, the slopes of the curves still reveal the type of jointness at these 
earnings combinations. 
12. In Germany and Belgium, there is an initial slight increase in the second-earner tax rate at low levels of 
primary-earner income provided that the secondary earner also enters at a low earnings level. This is 
because these countries employ an earnings disregard in the transfer system, so that the lowest-income 
families are not affected by benefit withdrawal. 
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 converge towards no jointness as the income of the primary earner becomes high.13 Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom display this pattern, which we may label negative-neutral 
jointness. The strongest example of this pattern is perhaps the United Kingdom where negative jointness at 
the bottom is driven by both the welfare and the tax system. The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), an 
in-work cash benefit provided through the tax system, is based on household income and is phased out at a 
rate of 70%. The combination of the WFTC and the withdrawal of social assistance and housing benefits 
creates participation tax rates at around 70-90% for secondary earners married to low-income spouses. 
While second-earner participation in the UK is therefore strongly discouraged in low-income families, it is 
encouraged in higher-income families due to the individual income tax. In particular, because working 
spouses with low earnings are not liable to pay either income tax or social insurance contributions, the 
second-earner tax rate at SEp5 and SEp10 drops to zero once primary-earner income exceeds PEp30 and 
stays at zero as primary earnings increase. 
Another group of countries combine negative jointness at the bottom with positive jointness at the top. 
Countries with this pattern of negative-positive jointness are Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal. All of these countries operate a progressive tax system based on family income 
causing the secondary-earner participation tax to be increasing in primary-earner income once the family is 
beyond the phase-out range of welfare programs. However, the degree of positive jointness at the top is 
generally quite weak and much less salient than the negative jointness at the bottom. This may seem 
surprising but can be explained by the fact that the effective marginal tax rate structure is quite flat in most 
European countries, partly as a result of often very substantial social security contributions, which are all 
based on individual earnings and therefore dampen the jointness of the system as a whole (see Table A1). 
As explained above, a completely linear tax system, even if it is based on family income, effectively 
implies separability in the tax treatment of spouses. Notice also that, in France, the curve is relatively flat 
both at the bottom and at the top because the withdrawal of various family benefits and housing assistance 
occurs at different income levels and tends to offset the presence of positive jointness in the income tax.14
                                                     
13. Notice that a flat (linear) income tax, even if it is based on family income, effectively implies separability 
in the tax treatment of spouses. As an example, this is important for Denmark, which operates a form of 
joint taxation by combining individual filing with the possibility of transferring certain allowances and 
exemptions across spouses. However, because the marginal tax rate structure is quite flat there is very little 
jointness at the top. 
14. In France, the drop in the participation tax rate for low-wage secondary earners (at SEp10) when the 
primary-earner income becomes very high (at PEp95) is due to complicated features of the income test for 
family benefits (Allocations Familiales) that were in place only in 1998, the year of our sample. 
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Greece, Italy, and to some extent the Netherlands are the only countries that show virtually no jointness. 
All three countries operate individual income tax systems, and in Greece and Italy only very limited 
means-tested benefits are available.15 The Netherlands does offer family-based social assistance, but 
primary earnings are higher in the Netherlands than in most other countries, implying that transfer phase-
out plays a limited role for second-earner labour market entry.16 Spain is the only country characterized by 
positive jointness. There is no social assistance and the design of the Spanish income tax implies that, for 
low-income families, it is optimal to file under the optional joint tax. For higher-income families, it is 
typically optimal to file separately, which explains why there is less jointness if the secondary earner is at 
the median or above. 
4. A Welfare Evaluation of Cutting Taxes for Secondary Earners 
It is often argued that the tax burden on secondary earners should be reduced in order to increase economic 
efficiency. Indeed, a traditional Ramsey-type efficiency argument calls for a low marginal tax rate on 
secondary earners because their labour supply is relatively elastic (Rosen, 1977; Boskin and Sheshinski, 
1983). The traditional argument is derived in a model with only hours-of-work responses and where the tax 
system is restricted to be linear (albeit gender specific). However, the modern empirical labour supply 
literature shows that the strong responsiveness of the labour supply of married females is driven by labour 
force participation, not by hours worked for those who are working (e.g. Heckman, 1993; Blundell and 
MaCurdy, 1999). This calls for a policy that reduces the participation tax rate on secondary earners. 
A policy change should be evaluated, not just in terms of efficiency, but also with respect to its 
consequences for distributional equity. A revenue-neutral reform reducing the participation tax rate on 
secondary earners necessarily implies a redistribution in favour of two-earner couples at the expense of 
one-earner and/or zero-earner couples. To the extent that two-earner couples are better off than zero- and 
one-earner couples such reforms come at the cost of a reduction in distributional equity. While the 
statement that two-earner couples are better off than zero-earner couples seems noncontroversial, the 
comparison between one- and two-earner couples is more subtle. Notice first that, for a given level of 
primary earnings, the notion that two-earner couples are better off than one-earner couples is consistent 
                                                     
15. In Greece, no means-tested benefits are available for married couples. In Italy, such benefits are very 
limited, especially for couples without kids as reflected by the almost completely flat curve (in appendix) 
for those couples. Further, family benefits in Italy are phased-out in discrete amounts at different income 
levels, which accounts for the small bumps visible for low-income families. 
16. The small bump around PEp40 reflects mandatory health insurance contributions for non-working spouses 
that apply to primary earners with earnings below a certain threshold. Above this earnings level, health 
insurance contributions for non-working spouses are voluntary and hence not counted as taxes. 
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 with the underlying assumption in all of the optimal income tax literature that higher household income is a 
signal of higher utility.17 Whether two-earner couples are better off on average depends also on the sorting 
in the marriage market. Positive sorting in earnings (such that two-earner couples tend to have higher 
primary-earner income along with the presence of secondary-earner income) reinforces the view that two-
earner couples are better off. On the other hand, if there is negative sorting whereby rich people tend to 
have non-working spouses, it is theoretically possible that one-earner couples are better off on average. 
However, as shown by Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2008) for the UK, there is a positive correlation in 
spousal earnings (conditional on working) combined with a very weak correlation between primary-earner 
income and spousal labour force participation. All this suggests that two-earner couples are better off, so 
that lowering the participation tax on secondary earners comes at a cost of distributional equity. 
In this section, we start by setting out a simple “extensive” labour supply model allowing us to evaluate the 
efficiency-equity trade-off for reforms aimed at increasing second-earner participation. In particular, we 
consider small (marginal) tax reforms, which provide a transfer to two-earner couples financed by either a 
tax on both zero- and one-earner couples or a tax on one-earner couples only. The taxes and transfers 
implemented by the reforms are lump sum conditional on family participation status and therefore do not 
affect marginal tax rates. Reforms of this type could, e.g., be implemented in practice by changing the 
structure of family allowances. At the end of the section, we generalize the labour supply model to 
incorporate both intensive and extensive responses for both spouses, and consider reforms that reduce the 
tax burden on secondary earners by changing marginal tax rates. 
4.1. A Simple Joint Labour Supply Model 
We consider couples where each spouse decides whether or not to work, but where hours worked 
conditional on working are fixed. Labour force participation varies across couples due to heterogeneity in 
earnings potential and work costs, and households can be grouped into three different categories: no-
earner, one-earner, and two-earner couples. In each household, we identify a primary earner and a 
secondary earner where, by definition, the primary earner enters the labour market first and has higher 
earnings conditional on working. Each spouse is characterized by a fixed earnings potential, which we 
denote by ( )hshp zz ,  for the two spouses in a household of type  . Letting  ( h iz spi ,=  ) denote the actual 
earnings choice, the participation choice for each spouse then amounts to choosing between 0=iz  and 
                                                     
17. In the presence of general non-linear tax instruments, the relevant comparison for the determination of the 
optimal tax on secondary entry is indeed between different types of couples at a given level of primary 
earnings (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2007). 
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h
ii zz =  . The number of households of type  is denoted , h hN Hh ,...,1= , and the total population of 
households equals  . h
H
h NN ∑≡ =1
All households share a common quasi-linear utility function given by 
( ) ( ) ( ),0101,, >⋅−>⋅−= ssppsp zqzqczzcu         (2) 
where  is household consumption, and  denote work costs for the primary and secondary 
earner, respectively. The work costs capture all costs associated with labour market entry such as a distaste 
for participation, the value of lost home production, costs of child care and commuting, etc. The indicator 
function  takes on the value 1 when a given spouse works (   
c sp qq ,
( ).1 ,0>iz spi ,=  ) and zero otherwise. The 
above utility specification rules out income effects which simplifies considerably the theoretical analysis 
(Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2007, 2008) as well as the welfare aggregation. 
The household faces a non-linear income tax schedule ( )θ,, sp zzT , where θ  is a shift parameter that we 
use below to capture the effects of a tax reform. The tax function constitutes a net payment to the public 
sector, embodying both taxes and transfers. The consumption of each household equals their total net-of-
tax earnings, such that eq. (2) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ).0101,, >⋅−>⋅−−+= ssppspsp zqzqzzTzzu θ       (3) 
Households choose earnings  and  so as to maximize eq. (3). For households of type h  (i.e., earnings 
pair ,  ), there is a distribution of fixed costs described by a continuous joint density function 
pz sz
h
pz
h
sz
( )sph qqf ,  defined over [  . We define the unconditional density and distribution functions of 
 as 
) [ )∞×∞ ,0,0
pq ( )ph qf  and ( )ph qF , and the conditional density and distribution functions of  as sq ( )psh qqp  and 
( )ps qqP , and hence the joint density can be written as ( ) ( ) ( )phpshsph qfqqpqqf ⋅=,  . 
Consistent with much empirical work in this area, we consider households making a sequential labour 
force participation decision. First, it is decided whether or not the primary earner should enter the labour 
market and then, conditional on primary-earner participation, it is decided if the secondary earner should 
join the labour force as well. We need to ensure that the assumed entry sequence is consistent with 
household optimization, which amounts to a restriction on the joint distribution of fixed work costs. Figure 
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 2 illustrates the problem by depicting the possible joint labour supply choices of the two spouses. The 
crucial assumption we make is that, both before and after a tax reform, couples are observed only in the 
shaded areas (0, 1 and 2). The part of the assumption that concerns the initial (before-reform) distribution 
of couples is innocuous, because we simply define the primary earner (i.e., the highest-earning spouse) in 
such a way that it is consistent with the permissible pattern. However, when we consider tax reforms that 
induce families to change participation status, we must make sure that no families move to region ∅ in the 
figure. This problem is reminiscent of the double-deviation problem in optimal multi-dimensional pricing 
theory (e.g. Armstrong and Rochet, 1999) and in the theory of optimal taxation with more than one 
dimension of unobserved household characteristics (e.g. Mirrlees, 1976, 1986; Kleven et al., 2007). While 
the double-deviation problem poses considerable complexity for studies that attempt to solve for the 
optimal incentive scheme in a multi-dimensional screening context, it is easier to deal with the issue here 
because we consider only small perturbations (marginal reforms) around an initial equilibrium. Appendix 
A shows how we deal with the double-deviation issue by imposing restrictions on the distribution of fixed 
costs. 
Given the assumed sequence of labour market entries, a primary earner decides to enter if the net 
household utility gain of doing so, conditional on spousal non-participation, is positive. For household h , 
this implies 
( ) ( )[ ] ,,0,0,0, hphphpp qTzTzq ≡−−≤ θθ         (4) 
where hpq  is the net-of-tax income gain of primary-earner entry for household type  . Primary 
earners with 
h
h
pp qq ≤  decide to enter the labour market at , whereas primary earners with hpp zz =
h
pp qq >  stay outside the labour force. Conditional on primary-earner entry, the secondary earner in 
household  enters if h
( ) ( )[ ] ,,0,,, hshphshphss qzTzzTzq ≡−−≤ θθ         (5) 
where hsq  is the net-of-tax income gain of second-earner entry. 
Let ( )[ ]hphhh qFNE −= 10 , ( ) hhphhh EqFNE 21 −=  and ( ) ( ) pphphshqhh dqqfqqPNE hp∫= 02  denote, 
respectively, the number of zero-earner, one-earner, and two-earner couples of type  . Consistent with h
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our assumed sequence of labour market entry, we define the participation elasticities for primary and 
secondary earners as 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ),11,11 2211 h
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where ( ) ( )[ ] hphphp zTzTa /,0,0,0, θθ −≡  is the participation tax rate for primary earners in household 
type h , and ( ) ( )[ ] hshphshphs zzTzzTa /,0,,, θθ −≡  is the participation tax rate for secondary earners. 
Because no households are observed with only the secondary earner working, government revenue can be 
written as 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ],,0,0,0,,, 012 hhhphhshp
h
ETEzTEzzTR θθθ ++= ∑  
which is simply the sum of the tax proceeds (net of transfers) from two-earner families (first term), 
one-earner families (second term), and zero-earner families (third term). 
4.2. A Microsimulation Study of Reform 
This section studies the effects of small tax reforms, θd , that reduce the tax burden on second-earner 
participation, , and are revenue-neutral, 0/ <∂∂ θhsa 0/ =θddR  . As explained above, such reforms 
necessarily imply a redistribution in favour of two-earner couples at the expense of one- and zero-earner 
couples, and are therefore associated with a trade-off between equity and efficiency.  
We derive theoretical measures of the equity-efficiency trade-offs associated with two specific reforms as a 
function of behavioural elasticities and parameters of the tax-transfer system, and apply the analytical 
results to our samples of married couple populations in 15 EU countries using EUROMOD. 
Following Browning and Johnson (1984) and Immervoll et al. (2007), we divide the population into those 
who gain from the reform and those who lose from the reform. We denote by  the aggregate 
welfare gain of those who gain from the reform and by 
0≥dG
0≤dL  the aggregate welfare change of those who 
loose from the reform. Notice that a Pareto improving reform (no losers) implies , whereas a Pareto 
worsening reform (no gainers) implies 
0=dL
0=dG  . 
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 Due to the efficiency effects of changing distortionary taxes and transfers, the decline in welfare for those 
who lose from the reform (i.e., zero- and one-earner couples) is generally different from the gain in welfare 
for those who gain from the reform (i.e., two-earner couples). In particular, because we consider reforms 
designed to increase efficiency by subsidizing second-earner participation, we would expect that the gain 
for two-earner couples is higher than the loss for zero- and one-earner couples. At the same time, because 
two-earner couples tend to be better off than the rest of the population, policy makers may put a lower 
social welfare weight on the gain for two-earner couples. A critical question then becomes how to evaluate 
the desirability of reforms involving such inter-household utility trade-offs. The standard approach has 
been to postulate a social welfare function associated with certain welfare weights across different 
households, but the problem is that the inter-household comparisons implied by the adopted social welfare 
function are subjective and this limits the applicability of such an analysis as an input into the policy-
making process. Following Immervoll et al. (2007), we therefore adopt a different approach, which 
consists in estimating critical values for the social welfare weights that would make a reform break even in 
terms of social welfare. 
To make this precise, we define the inter-household utility trade-off Ψ  in the following way: 
.
dG
dL−=Ψ  
The resulting number may be interpreted as the Euro-value of the welfare loss for those who lose from the 
reform (zero- and one-earner couples) per additional Euro transferred to those who gain (two-earner 
couples). If the reform succeeds in increasing efficiency ( 0>+ dGdL  ), the value of Ψ  is below 1, 
implying that it costs less than one Euro for zero-earner and one-earner couples to transfer an additional 
Euro to two-earner couples. However, to the extent that the social marginal welfare weight on two-earner 
couples relative to other couples is below one, 1<Ψ  does not necessarily make the reform desirable. 
Generally, the lower is , the more desirable is the reform, and if Ψ 0=Ψ  the reform represents a Pareto-
improvement. 
The first reform (Reform A) reduces tax rates on secondary earners by uniformly lowering the tax burden 
on two-earner couples financed by uniformly increasing the tax burden on zero- and one-earner couples. 
The size of the extra tax on zero- and one-earner couples is determined endogenously to balance the 
government budget taking into account the revenue implications of behavioural responses. The reform 
increases second-earner participation, but has no effect on primary-earner incentives to enter the labour 
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market as the tax increase is uniform across households with one earner and no earners. The trade-off 
measure for Reform A may be derived as (see Appendix A) 
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where  is the share of two-earner couples in the total population of couples, and  is the share of 
two-earner couples that are of type  . This type of reform is always associated with an inter-household 
trade-off  below 1: the increase in second-earner participation (at unchanged primary-earner 
participation) raises revenue, implying that the government can finance a welfare increase of one Euro to 
two-earner couples by imposing a welfare cost of less than one Euro on all other couples. It is clear from 
eq. (6) that the key determinants of the inter-household trade-off are the participation tax rates and 
participation elasticities of secondary earners, and that 
2e
he2
h
Ψ
Ψ  is decreasing in  and  as one would 
expect. 
h
sa
h
sη
The second reform (Reform B) finances the tax cut on two-earner couples by taxing only one-earner 
couples, thereby avoiding a reduction in the welfare of zero-earner families. While reform B is associated 
with a better distributional profile than Reform A, the efficiency effects may be less desirable for Reform 
B because it increases participation tax rates on primary earners. The trade-off measure for Reform B can 
be expressed as (see Appendix A) 
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where  is the share of one-earner households in the population, and  is the share of one-earner 
households that are of type  . As for the first reform, the trade-off associated with Reform B is decreasing 
in second-earner participation tax rates and participation elasticities. The trade-off  additionally 
depends on primary-earner parameters: higher participation tax rates and higher participation elasticities 
for primary earners increase the trade-off. This reflects the negative efficiency effect associated with some 
one-earner couples dropping back to the zero-earner schedule as the tax on one-earner couples increases. 
Although the negative participation responses of primary earners tend to worsen the trade-off of reform B 
compared to reform A, there is an offsetting effect that tends to make the reform more desirable. The 
impact on the second-earner participation incentive is larger for reform B, because it finances the tax cuts 
1e
he1
h
BΨ
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 for two-earner families entirely by higher taxes on one-earner families and therefore has a larger effect on 
the utility difference between two-earner and one-earner couples. Thus, it is theoretically possible that 
reform B improves efficiency by more than reform A, and this is more likely to occur if the share of one-
earner households e  is low, in which case reform B leads to a large tax increase for one-earner 
households. 
1
We now turn to numerical simulations based on EUROMOD. As described, we identify the primary earner 
as the highest-earning member of the couple, and construct pre-tax earnings distributions for primary and 
secondary earners. Because the theoretical analysis is based on a discrete formulation dividing the 
population of couples into H  earnings-groups, we have to define these subgroups in the empirical 
application. We divide the sample based on earnings quintiles (conditional on working) for primary and 
secondary earners, which yields 30 household groups ( 5x5 two-earner families and 5 one-earner families). 
For each household group, we calculate a participation tax rate using the approach described in Section 3. 
We calibrate participation elasticities based on the empirical labour supply literature. There is an extensive 
literature on the labour force participation of married couples based on data from the United States and 
European countries. This literature has been surveyed by, among others, Blundell (1995) and Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999). The literature finds that participation elasticities for married women (secondary earners) 
are substantial across a wide set of countries with values ranging from 0.5 to 1, whereas participation 
elasticities for prime-age males (primary earners) tend to be very small. Moreover, there is evidence that 
participation elasticities tend to be larger at the bottom of the earnings distribution than at the top of the 
earnings distribution, although some studies have found that elasticities for married women may still be 
substantial at the top (e.g. Eissa, 1995). 
Results of the simulations are presented in Table 3. We consider four different elasticity scenarios. The 
first three scenarios assume that the participation elasticities are constant across earnings groups, whereas 
the last scenario assumes that elasticities are higher at the bottom. Average elasticities for primary and 
secondary earners are shown in the table for each scenario. 
We start by focusing on Reform A. Recall that the inter-household trade-off associated with this reform 
(eq. psi1) does not depend on the participation elasticity for primary earners, only the elasticity for 
secondary earners matters. The first scenario assumes a participation elasticity of 0.5 for secondary earners. 
In this scenario, many countries show a quite favourable trade-off. In Germany, one- and zero-earner 
couples incur a loss of just 0.14 Euros for an additional Euro distributed to two-earner couples. In Belgium, 
Denmark, and France, second-earner tax rates are so high that a tax cut to two-earner families creates 
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Laffer effects and therefore a Pareto improvement. In general, the favourable trade-offs for this reform and 
elasticity scenario reflect the high participation tax rates on secondary earners (compared to elasticities) 
that we saw in Table 2. In accordance with the pattern in Table 2, Reform A is less attractive in Greece, the 
UK, and Spain than in Northern-Continental European countries and Scandinavia. 
Not surprisingly, Reform A becomes better (worse) as the participation elasticity of secondary earners 
increases (declines). In the second scenario where the second-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.7, the 
reform is costless or nearly costless to zero- and one-earner couples in half of the countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden). On the other hand, in the third scenario where 
the second-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.3, it is only Belgium that has no losers from the reform. 
Nevertheless, even in this scenario, nine countries have trade-offs at or below 1/2. Scenario 4 assumes the 
same average elasticity as in the first scenario but with a declining profile as a function of earnings.18 The 
results do not change much compared to scenario 1, although there is a general tendency for the trade-off 
measure to increase. The reason is that the positive feedback effect on government revenue from higher 
participation is lower when the additional participation is generated at lower earnings levels where second-
earner participation tax rates are typically lower. 
The consequences of Reform B depend also on the primary-earner participation elasticity. In scenario 1, 
where the primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.1, we see that Ψ  increases compared to Reform A but 
that the differences between the two reforms are small for all countries. Hence, the two counteracting 
effects on economic efficiency discussed above more or less cancel out in this elasticity scenario. When we 
look across the different scenarios, the effects of Reform A and B are roughly comparable except for 
Scenario 3 where we assume equal responsiveness for primary and secondary earners. This scenario is not 
realistic but highlights the importance of the relative participation elasticities when evaluating reforms of 
type B that affect zero- and one-earner couples differently. In this scenario, ten countries would experience 
lower efficiency by implementing reform B (i.e., 1>Ψ  ), and in seven of those countries nobody gains 
from the reform (Pareto worsening). The explanation is that, for most countries, primary earners face 
higher participation tax rates than secondary earners. This implies that, with identical elasticities, that 
primary-earner labour supply is more distorted than second-earner labour supply, and it is therefore 
suboptimal to induce additional second-earner entry at the expense of primary-earner exit. 
                                                     
18. The primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.3 at the lowest quintile of the primary earner income 
distribution (PEq1), 0.1 for PEq2 and PEq3, and 0 for PEq4 and PEq5. For secondary earners, the elasticity 
equals 0.8 for the lowest quintile of the secondary earner income distribution (SEq1), 0.6 for SEq2, 0.2 for 
SEq3, and 0 for SEq4 and SEq5. 
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 4.3. Evaluating Reforms that Affect the Intensive Margin of Labour Supply 
The reforms considered so far shift the tax burden across couples without changing marginal tax rates. 
Such reforms do not affect the intensive margin of labour supply (in the absence of income effects), and 
the assumption of fixed hours of work is therefore innocuous in the context of those reforms. But to 
analyze reforms associated with changes in marginal tax rates, it is necessary to extend the model to allow 
for both intensive and extensive responses for both spouses. Appendix B extends the model in this way, 
and derives the effects of a reform (Reform C) that uniformly reduces the marginal tax rate on secondary 
earners financed by uniformly increasing the marginal tax rate on primary earners in one-earner couples. 
Zero-earner couples are left unaffected. Like Reform B considered above, the reform considered here shifts 
participation taxes from secondary earners to primary earners, but the profile of the tax changes is 
different. Compared to the previous reform, changes in participation taxes are now higher at the top and 
lower at the bottom. 
Table 4 presents the inter-household utility trade-off implied by reform C for three different elasticity 
scenarios. In all three scenarios, the participation elasticities are set at our preferred levels of 0.1 for 
primary earners and 0.5 for secondary earners. To establish a benchmark, the first scenario assumes that 
hours-of-work elasticities are equal to zero for both spouses. In this case, Reform C is associated with 
slightly more favourable trade-offs than Reform B. The reason is that the participation tax rates of 
secondary earners often have an increasing profile (due to the progressivity of the tax system), whereas the 
participation tax rates of primary earners often display a decreasing profile (due to the impact of means-
tested transfers on the first entrant). This implies that reform C (relative to Reform B) concentrates the tax 
cuts to secondary earners on those with the highest participation tax rates, while it concentrates the tax 
increases for primary earners on those with the lowest participation tax rates. The second scenario sets the 
intensive elasticity to 0.1 for both primary and secondary earners. This generates an additional efficiency 
gain on the intensive margin for secondary earners, but also an efficiency loss from the intensive responses 
of primary earners. The total effect is that trade-offs are slightly more favourable. Scenario 3 features the 
same overall responsiveness on the intensive margin as Scenario 2 (the sum of the two elasticities is 
unchanged), but the response is now concentrated entirely on secondary earners. This makes reform C even 
more attractive and five countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden) can implement the 
reform at no distributional cost. 
Our conclusion is that the incorporation of hours-of-work responses into the analysis (assuming realistic 
elasticities) does not change the qualitative insights offered above and has a fairly small quantitative 
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impact. If anything, the conclusions regarding the welfare effects of cutting taxes for secondary earners are 
reinforced by this generalization. 
5. Marriage Penalties in Europe 
We now turn our attention to the tax-transfer implications of marriage. We present estimates of the 
marriage penalty defined as the increase in the combined tax liability net of transfers of two individuals 
following marriage.19 The marriage penalty has attracted significant interest historically, especially in the 
United States where tax acts affecting married couples have often been motivated by an attempt to `fix' the 
problem of marriage penalties. The concern about marriage penalties has been motivated by notions of 
fairness in the tax treatment of families (horizontal equity across married and cohabitating couples), and by 
the possibility that tax and transfer incentives distort the decision to marry. A number of papers have 
studied the effects on marriage and divorce from income taxes (e.g. Alm and Whittington, 1995a,b, 1997, 
1999), welfare benefits (e.g. Hoynes, 1997a,b; Moffitt, 1998; Bitler et al., 2004), or taxes and benefits 
combined (Dickert-Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b). Although these studies tend to find either 
modest or no effects, the implications of marriage disincentives continue to be a controversial point of 
contention and marriage-dependent taxes and transfers are frequently accused by conservatives of 
destroying the traditional two-parent family and creating higher rates of single motherhood. 
Almost all existing studies of marriage penalties focus on the United States and account only for the 
implications of the tax system (e.g. Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995; Alm and Whittington, 1996; 
Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998; Bull et al., 1999; Alm et al., 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a). An 
exception to this strong US-orientation in the literature is the comparative study of marriage taxes by 
Pechman and Engelhardt (1990) who considered a subset of the European countries in our sample. While 
Pechman and Engelhardt considered only the tax system, we have seen in this paper that most of the 
jointness in redistribution schemes in Europe is driven by the welfare system suggesting that there may be 
important transfer-consequences to marriage. EUROMOD allows us to undertake a comparative study of 
marriage penalties across a large set of countries, and to incorporate fully the implication of both the tax 
and the transfer system. 
                                                     
19. While we use the term marriage penalty throughout the paper, it would perhaps be more precise to use the 
label formal cohabitation penalty. In principle, income transfers are based on family income regardless of 
marital status, although in practice it is difficult for the authorities to verify cohabitation when there is no 
marriage certificate. 
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 It is helpful to start by considering some general properties of marriage penalties. Denoting by ( ).iT  the 
tax function (net of transfers) that applies to individual filers and by ( ).cT  the tax function applying to 
couples, the marriage penalty is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]., sipispc zTzTzzTMP +−≡         (8) 
Individual income tax treatment of couples, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )sipispc zTzTzzT +=, , is the only income tax 
system that does not introduce a distortion of the marriage decision, 0=MP  . On the other hand, jointness 
generally implies , and the sign of 0≠MP MP  depends on the design of the joint schedule and on the 
pair of incomes  in a given family. If sp zz , MP  is negative, we say that there is a marriage subsidy. An 
example of a tax system giving rise to marriage subsidies (ignoring the welfare system) is a progressive 
and fully joint tax scheme with income splitting, so that each spouse is liable to pay taxes on half the 
couple's combined earnings. Formally, this is a system where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( spczzizzispc zzTTTzzT spsp +≡+= ++ 22, )  . Income splitting subsidizes marriage by allowing a 
couple to avoid part of the progressivity of the tax system. 
Family-based and means-tested transfers generally give rise to marriage penalties. As in Section sec-
jointness, let us separate the T -functions into taxes ( ( ) ( ).,. ic tt  ) and benefits (  ). The 
combination of individual taxation and family-based transfers then implies 
( ) ( ).,. ic bb
( ) ( ) ( )spcsipi z+zbzbzbMP −+≡  . Then, if the ( ).ib  and ( ).cb  functions are the same (so that marital 
status is not an eligibility criterion in its own right), we have  because  as a result of 
means-testing. Moreover, if there is additional targeting to single parents (in which case   
0>MP ( ) 0. <′b
( ) <zbc ( )zbi  
given the presence of children), the marriage penalty is even higher. Because family-based, means-tested 
transfers as well as targeting to single motherhood tend to be very important at the bottom of the 
distribution, we would expect to find significant marriage penalties at the bottom. Moreover, these features 
would be particularly important in countries where welfare systems are relatively generous (such as the 
Nordic countries). 
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The marriage penalty in eq. (8) is calculated using EUROMOD by measuring the change in the combined 
tax liability net of transfers of a couple following a separation, holding individual earnings constant.20 We 
consider households at ten different earnings configurations, ranging from both spouses being out of work 
to both spouses earning at the top decile in their respective earnings distributions, and we consider families 
with either two children or no children. When children are involved, we assume that each spouse takes 
custody of one child after the divorce.21 We also assume that, following the divorce, each spouse faces half 
the rental cost of the couple when they were married.22 The marriage penalties are shown in Table 5 for the 
case of two children. Table A4 in the appendix shows the results for families without children. Marriage 
penalties are reported on an annual basis and in 2007 Euros. 
The results reveal substantial marriage penalties in most countries, and the penalties depend primarily on 
the income of the lowest-earning spouse. Indeed, marriage penalties are often very high even when the 
primary earner is at the top decile as long as second-earner income is low. Moreover, marriage penalties 
are almost everywhere considerably higher when the couple has children, often more than twice as high. 
These patterns point to the benefit system as an important determinant of marriage penalties. In fact, in all 
countries, the strong targeting of transfer programs to single parents is the single most important factor 
contributing to marriage penalties. The tax system per se is not very important. As a result, the highest 
marriage penalties are found in countries that have the most generous benefit programs such as the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Because of highly targeted transfers to single parents, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland also show substantial marriage penalties for families with children, although 
their social assistance programs are on the whole less generous than those of the Nordic countries. 
There are some exceptions to this general pattern of high marriage penalties. Italy offers non-trivial 
marriage subsidies resulting from family benefits available only to married couples with children. The tax-
                                                     
20. Although individual earnings may of course change following a separation, it is conceptually important to 
keep earnings constant in order to obtain the correct tax price on marriage. Notice that, if earnings were 
allowed to change at separation, even a fully individual-based redistribution scheme would appear to 
feature marriage penalties or subsidies. 
21. The assumption of a 1-1 split of custody is different from the usual assumptions in the (US-based) 
literature on marriage taxes. This literature typically assumes that either (i) the children reside with the 
mother (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a) or (ii) custody is determined by a tax 
minimization strategy (Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995). Because the second assumption implies 
that typically the higher-earnings spouse takes custody of all the children, whereas the first assumption 
implies that typically the lower-earnings spouse gets the kids, our assumption of an equal split lies in 
between these two extremes. 
22. Our approach to the calculation of marriage penalties is closely related to the so-called Resource Pooling 
Approach (see Bull et al., 1999). Our calculations do not include unearned income and therefore capture 
only the marriage penalty arising from the tax-transfer treatment of earned income. 
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 transfer system in Greece is virtually neutral with respect to marriage for couples without children, but 
does feature minor penalties for couples with children. This is the result of an individual income tax 
combined with fairly small social assistance benefits that are available only to single parents. Spain tends 
to subsidize marriage for couples without children but penalize it for couples with children. In France, 
marriage subsidies are considerable for higher-income families.23
6. Conclusion 
The standard Mirrleesian theory of optimal income taxation assumes that all tax payers and transfer 
recipients live in single-person households. In reality, most individuals live in families formed around 
couples, and the tax-transfer rules applying to couples are often different from the rules applying to single 
individuals. A number of recent papers have attempted to generalize the theory of optimal income taxation 
to explicitly deal with couples. Instead of characterizing the optimal tax-transfer treatment of families, this 
paper characterizes the actual tax-transfer treatment of couples and identifies efficiency -improving (and 
possibly welfare-improving) reforms for 15 European countries. 
We have considered three aspects of a tax-transfer system for couples: the form of jointness, the distortion 
of second-earner labour supply, and the size of marriage penalties. A general insight from the analysis is 
that the transfer system is a crucial element in understanding and evaluating redistribution schemes 
affecting married couples. For example, it is the presence of family-based and means-tested transfer 
programs that explains the observation in many countries of negative jointness, i.e. a negative relationship 
between the effective tax rate on one person and the earnings of the spouse. Interestingly, negative 
jointness is in accordance with prescriptions from the recent optimal tax literature (Kleven, Kreiner and 
Saez, 2007, 2008). At the same time, family-based transfers tend to create substantial marriage penalties at 
the bottom of the distribution, which raise issues pertaining to fairness and to some extent efficiency. 
Our analysis of tax-transfer distortions at the extensive margin of labour supply suggests that the effective 
taxation of secondary earners relative to primary earners is too high given the empirical evidence on 
participation elasticities. Simple revenue-neutral reforms that shift some of the tax burden from two-earner 
couples to one-earner and/or zero-earner couples would reduce the distortion of second-earner labour 
                                                     
23. An additional important factor determining marriage penalties are housing benefits. In results not reported 
here, we have calculated marriage penalties under alternative assumptions about housing costs following 
separation. For example, if rental costs for each spouse are at the same level as the combined rental costs of 
the couple (reflecting economies of scale in two-person households), the size of marriage penalties are 
considerably affected in some countries (in particular, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, and the Netherlands). 
 30
  
supply and may generate substantial welfare gains. In fact, for some countries, a tax cut for secondary 
earners may realistically pay for itself and give rise to a Pareto improvement. For countries where Laffer 
effects are not present, a tax cut for two-earner families does require a higher tax on other couples, but the 
required tax increase tends to be reasonably small. In a majority of countries, it is possible to transfer 1 
euro to two-earner couples by taking away less than 1/2 a euro from other couples. 
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (6) AND (7) 
We derive the inter-household utility trade-off under the assumption that there are no households with 
only the secondary earner working either before or after a reform. To ensure that this is consistent with 
household optimization we must restrict the distribution of the fixed costs of work for secondary earners. 
In terms of Figure 2, we must make sure that a marginal reform does not induce any families to position 
themselves in area ∅. We denote by  the indirect family utility function, which depends on the work 
status of the two spouses. The conditions we will impose on the distribution of fixed costs of work for the 
secondary earner amount to saying that, following a marginal reform, the indirect utility is greater for 
( )⋅hV
all 
families if they are in area 0 of Figure 2 than if they are in area ∅. A sufficient condition makes sure that 
no couples have a high fixed cost of work for the primary earner  and at the same time a relatively low 
 for the secondary earner. 
pq
sq
Let ( ) ( ) ( )0,01,00 VVq hhs −≡  be the gain from secondary earner entry for household type h  when the 
primary earner is not working, and let ( ) ( ) ( )1,01,11 hhhp VVq −≡  be the gain from primary earner entry 
when the secondary earner is already working. Further, let ( ){ }hphphp qqq ,1min≡  where hpq  is determined 
by (qar). We will assume a lower bound on the secondary earner fixed costs of work depending on the 
primary earner's fixed costs of work, ( )phs qq , such that ( )( ) 0≡pphsh qqqP  . The lower bound assumption 
is 
( ) ( ) .for  0 hpphsphs qqqqq >>         (A-1) 
The reason for the two different thresholds for the primary earner is that we must consider both the 
potential movement from area 2 to area ∅ and from area 0 to area ∅ in Figure 2. 
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 With this assumption, there will be no households with only the secondary earner working either before 
or after marginal reforms. Government revenue can then be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where  is the number of two-earner households of type h , or equivalently, the number of working 
secondary earners of type ,  is the number of one-earner households of type , and  is the 
number of type  households without any labour force attachment. 
hE2
h hE1 h
hE0
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The effect of a small reform, θd , on government revenue is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ,0,00,10,11,1
0,00,11,1
0,00,11,1
0,00,11,1
212
012
012
012
⎥⎦
⎤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−+
⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=
⎥⎦
⎤+++
⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=
∑
∑
θθθ
θθθ
θθθ
θθθθ
d
dE
d
dETT
d
dETT
ETETET
d
dET
d
dET
d
dET
ETETET
d
dR
hh
hh
h
hh
hhhhhh
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
hhhhhh
h
   (A-3) 
because 
.210 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= θθθ d
dE
d
dE
d
dE hhh
 
The first three terms in (A-3) reflect mechanical effects while the last two terms capture the effects of 
the behavioural responses. The mechanical revenue effects are simply the direct effects on tax revenue 
with unchanged behaviour. The behavioural responses constitute new entry of secondary earners (term 4) 
as well as new entry by primary earners (term 5). 
The employment effects of the reform can be expressed using the participation elasticities from the main 
text. The change in total employment among couples is 
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where we have used 
( ) ( ) ( ).0/0,00,1 hphh
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The change in secondary employment is 
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Using (A-4) and (A-6) we can rewrite (A-3) as 
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Reform A. The first reform has 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,01,11,1,00,10,00,1 hTTTTT hhh ∀<∂
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where the tax increase to one- and no-earner families is determined endogenously. Because the reform is 
purely redistributive, government revenue must remain unchanged, 0=θddR , implying 
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where  is the total number of two-earner households in the economy and where we have 
used (da/dheta). From the envelope theorem and the marginal nature of the reform, monetary gains and 
losses are simply the direct changes in tax liabilities. Because all two-earner couples gain and all zero- and 
one-earner co uples lose, we have 
h
h EE 22 ∑=
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By inserting  and , we obtain expression (6). NEe /22 ≡ 222 / EEe hh ≡
Reform B. The second reform implies 
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again with the tax increase for two-earner couples exogenously given. We find 
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where  is the number of one-earner households and where we have used eqs. (A-5) and (A-
7) as well as the fact that only primary earners in one-earner couples respond to the reform. The trade-off 
between equity and efficiency equals 
h
h EE 11 ∑=
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−
−−=Ψ  . By inserting the derivatives from above and the 
definitions , , NEe /11 ≡ 111 / EEe hh = NEe /22 ≡  and , we obtain expression (7). 222 / EEe hh ≡
APPENDIX B: THE INTENSIVE-EXTENSIVE MODEL 
We introduce intensive responses by allowing individuals to choose working hours subject to the costs 
of working time given by ( )ppp nzv /  for primary earners and ( )sss nzv /  for secondary earners, where 
 is working time for an individual with earnings nz / z  and innate ability  . The household utility 
function is now given by 
n
( ) ( ) ( ).0101,, >⋅−>⋅−⎟⎟⎠
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Conditional on working, the primary earner chooses working hours according to 
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where  is the marginal tax rate faced by the primary earner, which may depend on the work 
status of the secondary earner. Thus,  denotes a working spouse and 
( ) ′≡⋅ php Tm
1=l 0=l  represents a non-working 
secondary earner. Similarly, the number of working hours for the secondary earners conditional on 
participation satisfies 
,1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=− ′ h
s
h
s
s
h
s n
zvm  
where  denotes the marginal tax rate for the secondary earner (which does not depend on the 
work status of the primary earner because a working secondary earner is always married to a working 
primary earner). Household behaviour along the intensive margin is captured by the intensive elasticities 
′≡ shs Tm
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which give the change in earnings in response to a change in the net-of-tax rate rates for the primary and 
the secondary earner, respectively. Since the marginal tax rates of an individual may now depend on 
spousal income, so may the choice of earnings. In particular, the earnings of the primary earner are likely 
to change when the secondary earner enters the labour market. Behaviour along the extensive margin is 
governed by the exact same logic as in the simpler model: the primary earner in household h  enters 
whenever entry increases the family's utility, i.e., when ( ) ( ) ph qVV ≥− 0,00,1  . Similarly, the secondary 
earner in household h  enters whenever ( ) ( ) shh qVV ≥− 0,11,1  .24 Compared to the simpler model, the 
correct definition of the secondary earner participation tax rate now includes the tax implications of the 
change in primary earnings, i.e., ( )( ) ( )( ) hshphshphs zzTzzTa /,0,0,,1 θθ −=  .25
The definition of government revenue R  is unchanged. The change in R  as a result of the reform, θd , 
is 
                                                     
24. Assumption (qs) is again sufficient to solve the double screening problem. 
25. In the empirical simulations, we are forced to assume that primary earnings remain unchanged when the 
secondary earner enters. 
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As before, the employment effects can be rewritten using elasticities to find 
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Reform C. The details of the reform are 
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where  is exogenous while 0>t τ  is endogenously determined by government budget neutrality, 
 . This implies 0=dR
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Using this expression, the trade-off between equity and efficiency becomes 
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where ( ) ( )( )hphphhphphp EzEzs 0/0 ∑≡  is the share of all earnings in one-earner families that accrues to 
households of type , and  is the share of all secondary earnings accruing to 
household  . 
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Table 1. Share of women among secondary earners 
Country One-earner 
couples
Two-earner 
couples
One- and two-
earner couples
Austria 0.96 0.87 0.90
Belgium 0.92 0.73 0.78
Denmark 0.83 0.82 0.82
Finland 0.65 0.76 0.75
France 0.93 0.74 0.80
Germany 0.91 0.78 0.83
Greece 0.98 0.75 0.90
Ireland 0.96 0.78 0.89
Italy 0.94 0.81 0.88
Luxembourg 0.99 0.77 0.89
Netherlands 0.95 0.88 0.91
Portugal 0.95 0.78 0.85
Spain 0.97 0.73 0.89
Sweden 0.66 0.76 0.75
United Kingdom 0.78 0.83 0.81
 
Note: Secondary earners are defined as the spouses with the lowest earnings in the couples. 
Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model. 
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Table 2. Participation tax rates and labour market outcomes 
 Participation Tax Participation Tax Relative Tax Relative Participation Relative Earnings
Country Primary Earners Secondary Earners (PE / SE)  ( PE / SE )  ( PE / SE )
Austria 0.63 0.36 1.72 1.66 2.18
Belgium 0.73 0.74 0.98 1.38 1.95
Denmark 0.73 0.53 1.38 1.13 1.74
Finland 0.60 0.36 1.65 1.05 1.66
France 0.85 0.63 1.35 1.53 1.67
Germany 0.63 0.51 1.22 1.53 1.99
Greece 0.27 0.28 0.97 3.13 1.61
Ireland 0.54 0.44 1.22 2.55 2.18
Italy 0.35 0.46 0.77 2.15 1.51
Luxembourg 0.50 0.32 1.54 2.52 2.25
Netherlands 0.56 0.44 1.28 1.68 2.61
Portugal 0.37 0.41 0.90 1.74 1.56
Spain 0.34 0.41 0.83 3.25 1.61
Sweden 0.66 0.51 1.28 1.07 1.53
United Kingdom 0.56 0.20 2.79 1.47 2.20
 
Note: The first two columns list the average effective participation tax rates for primary earners in one-earner couples and secondary 
earners in two-earner families, respectively. Columns 4 shows relative participation rates of primary and secondary earners and 
column 5 lists the relative average earnings of primary and secondary earners conditional on working. The calculation of the tax rates 
is described in the text. 
Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model. 
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Table 3. Inter-household utility trade-off for reforms A and B 
ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.5 ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.7 ηp = 0.3 ηs = 0.3 ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.5
Country A B A B A B A B
Austria 0.32 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.51 No Gainers 0.38 0.67
Belgium
Denmark 0.01 0.01 0.12 No Gainers 0.01 0.02
Finland 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.26 No Gainers 0.18 0.10
France 0.16 No Gainers
Germany 0.14 0.16 0.35 No Gainers 0.21 0.27
Greece 0.61 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.76 0.99 0.60 0.63
Ireland 0.27 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.52 1.73 0.30 0.39
Italy 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.55 0.80 0.34 0.34
Luxembourg 0.43 0.53 0.27 0.32 0.62 1.66 0.54 0.69
Netherlands 0.25 0.31 0.11 0.12 0.46 3.21 0.28 0.37
Portugal 0.28 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.85 0.38 0.39
Spain 0.46 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.66 0.89 0.45 0.47
Sweden 0.07 0.03 0.20 No Gainers 0.07 0.04
United Kingdom 0.58 0.77 0.46 0.56 0.72 No Gainers 0.65 1.03
No Losers
No Losers No Losers
No Losers
Scenario 3
Elasticity ProfileConstant Elasticity
Scenario 2
No Losers No Losers
No Losers
No Losers
Scenario 1
No Losers No Losers
Scenario 4
 
Note: The trade-off is calculated using formula (6) in the text for reform A and formula (7) for reform B. ηp is the participation elasticity 
of primary earners (PE) and ηs is the participation elasticity of secondary earners (SE). Note that the primary earner elasticity does not 
affect the trade-off in reform A. In scenarios 1-3, the elasticities are the same for all income groups. In scenario 4, earnings responses 
are concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. Specifically, ηp is 0.3 for primary earners in the lowest quintile of the PE 
earnings distribution (PEq1), 0.1 for PEq2 and PEq3, and 0 for PEq4 and PEq5. For secondary earners, the elasticity scenario is 1 for 
the lowest quintile of the SE earnings distribution (SEq1), 0.8 for SEq2, 0.5 for SEq3, 0.2 for SEq4 and 0 for SEq5. The average 
elasticities are listed above the results. 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on the EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
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Table 4. Inter-household utility trade-off for reform C 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Country εp = εs  = 0 εp = εs = 0.1 εp = 0  εs = 0.2
Austria 0.42 0.34 0.18
Belgium No Losers No Losers No Losers
Denmark 0.01 No Losers No Losers
Finland 0.05 0.03 0.00
France No Losers No Losers No Losers
Germany 0.11 0.00 No Losers
Greece 0.66 0.63 0.51
Ireland 0.26 0.15 0.01
Italy 0.30 0.23 0.11
Luxembourg 0.44 0.34 0.17
Netherlands 0.29 0.21 0.09
Portugal 0.18 0.11 0.03
Spain 0.48 0.45 0.35
Sweden 0.03 0.01 No Losers
United Kingdom 0.66 0.65 0.51
ηp = 0.1            ηs  = 0.5
Constant Elasticity
 
Note: The trade-off is calculated using formula (A-9) in Appendix D. ηp is the participation elasticity of primary earners (PE) and ηs is 
the participation elasticity of secondary earners (SE). Similarly, εp is the intensive elasticity of the PE and εs is the intensive elasticity 
of the SE. The participation elasticities are set at 0.1 for ηp and 0.5 for ηs in all scenarios. The elasticities never vary with income 
groups. 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on the EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
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Family Income Percentiles AT BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP SW UK
PE 0 - SE 0 5141 9770 7077 3676 14472 2387 1608 2224 0 7433 13549 0 0 10187 4696
PEp10 - SE 0 9353 10090 11640 6668 13059 5138 619 9156 -3234 12474 13375 2276 69 10495 7586
PEp10 - SEp10 7167 9712 11153 5116 7343 6573 762 10711 -1025 10624 11762 1125 837 5987 7782
PEp50 - SE 0 9353 6933 18148 12114 12096 9040 518 9999 -2307 10288 13632 2151 7 17444 13234
PEp50 - SEp10 7178 7071 11858 5611 6433 7692 615 7831 -686 4672 12343 593 849 5730 9406
PEp50 - SE p50 496 -575 9411 1055 2404 2267 57 3561 256 -3169 8814 355 1669 752 6066
PEp90 - SE 0 9353 6101 21936 14040 7308 8173 588 14318 -935 3249 12195 -187 7 17987 20780
PEp90 - SEp10 7294 6110 13457 7691 1962 7182 686 13868 -158 -2967 10713 -1621 1809 5730 17130
PEp90 - SEp50 496 -1274 10060 1055 -1192 3027 73 7023 294 -8042 6663 -1156 2821 1938 13790
PEp90 - SEp90 697 -575 6259 737 -288 955 244 5839 -422 -1027 7942 651 3316 0 2108
Note: The table shows marriage penalties on an annual basis for hypothetical families in 2007 Euros. The calculations are done for 
different earnings levels for the primary and secondary earner and the earnings levels refer to percentiles in the earnings distribution 
for primary and secondary earners, respectively. The marriage penalty is calculated as the change in a couple's combined (net-)tax 
liability upon separation. It is assumed that all individuals occupy rental housing. Following separation, each spouse is assumed to 
bear rental costs amounting to 50% of the costs in the married scenario. Further, each spouse retains custody of one child. 1998 
figures are converted to 2007 euros using national indices of compensation per employee. Exchange rates are, respectively, the 
irrevocable euro exchange rates (12 euro countries) and 2007 average annual exchange rates (non-euro countries: Denmark, 
Sweden, UK). 
Sources: EUROMOD microsimulation model, OECD Economic Outlook 82, and Danmarks Nationalbank. 
 
Table 5. Annual marriage penalties in 2007 euros for families with two children, 1998 
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Figure 1. Participation tax rates of secondary earners for couples with two children 
In percent, at selected earnings levels as a function of primary earnings (vingtiles) 
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Figure continues on next page 
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Note: Each figure shows the participation tax rate of the secondary earner (SE) in percent as a function of the earnings of the primary earner (PE), depicted by vingtile group in the PE 
earnings distribution. The graphs are shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and the top decile (SEp90) 
of the SE earnings distribution. Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
Figure 1. (cont.) 
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Figure 2. The double-deviation problem  
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Table A1. Summary of taxes on workers
Income Tax7 SSC (employee) SSC (employer) and Payroll Tax
lowest/highest 
tax band limit1,2
lowest/highest 
rate [%] main tax credit
1 tax unit family-related tax provisions
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1
tax 
deductible
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1 taxable
Austria 17/231 21/504 rates 5 individual
deduction for single earners; 
tax credits for lone parents 15 18.8 193 yes
15
-
21.3
4.5
193
- no
2nd earner: phase-out of single-earner 
credit
Belgium 24/318 25/557 rates - individual
parts of taxable income 
transferrable to spouse; 
additional tfa for children 
and lone parents
- 11.9 - yes - 45.4 - no
2nd earner: phase-out of amount 
transferrable from higher-earning 
spouse
Denmark 12/100 40/59
4
3 rates
- individual unused deductions transferrable to spouse -
9
+ flat amount - yes -
2
+ flat amount - no
Finland 35/223 24/56
4
6 rates
- individual -58
7.6
0.5 - yes - 24.5 - no
earned income tax allowance (20% of 
earnings above 11)
phase-out of earned income tax and 
basic allowances (starting at earnings 
> 31 and 76 respectively)
France 30/336 11/546 rates - family
-
-
-
136
-
0.9
9.6
2.84
3.6
7.6
-
136
409
545
-
yes
yes
yes
yes
partly
-
-
-
136
19.8
13.4
4.1
5.3
-
136
409
545
no reduced employer contributions rates for wages < 130% MW.
Germany
30
133
252
27.3
37.2
55.75
-
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
choice of tfa or child benefit 15 7.713.4
156
208 yes 15
7.7
13.4
156
208 no
Greece 56/478 5/455 rates
max. 15% of 
accepted hshld. 
expenditure
individual 0.9-1.8 non-refundable tax credit per child - 15.9
200; 
none for 
new jobs
yes - 28.2
200; 
none for 
new jobs
no
Ireland 25/80 24/462 rates -
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
- 4186
4.5
2.3
193
- no
-
112
-
8.5
12.0
4.0
12
231
231
no no tax if income below 33 (higher limit if children)
tax-free status phased out above the 
33 limit.
Italy 0/118 19/465 rates up to 6 individual
up to 2 tax credit for each 
dependent family member
-
56
9.04
1
- yes - 33.04 - no
phase-out of main tax credit;
2nd earner: phase-out of tax credit for 
dependent spouse;
Luxembourg 25/250 6/4717 rates -
married 
couple
deductions for lone parents 
and care expenditure; 3 tax 
credit per child
- 13.1 259 yes - 14.64 259 no
2nd earner: additional tax deduction if 
both spouses work
Netherlands 20/212 36
8/60
3 rates
- individual additional tfa for lone parents
54
-
5.3
1.7
156
105
yes
no
54
-
-
6.4
5.6
7.94
156
105
156
no
yes
no
Portugal 0/490 5
9/40
5 rates
3 married couple
additional 1.5 tax credit per 
child - 11 - no - 23.8 - no
Spain 22/492 20/568 rates 3
family 
(individual 
optional)
up to 2 tax credit per child 
(additional amounts in some 
regions)
46 30.8 177 yes 46 6.4 177 no earning < 55 are tax-exempt
"spike" in METR once above 
exemption limit; phase-out of main tax 
credit adds 5 pct. points to METR
Sweden 4/92 30
4
554
- individual - 3 6.95 121 yes 0.4 33 - no
United Kindgom 29/220 20/403 rates - individual
2 tax credit for married 
couples; 13 tax deduction 
for lone parents
23 8.4 to 10 177 no
2310
40
56
76
3
5
7
10
- no
features increasing METR and PTRfeatures reducing METR and PTR
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Abbreviations: SSC = social security contribution; METR = marginal effective tax rate; PTR = participation tax rate; tfa = tax free allowance; MW = statutory minimum wage. 
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Except where noted, all information is for private-sector employees with no other income and not claiming itemised expenses. Income taxes 
include local and regional taxes where applicable. Multiple lines of SSC entries are shown where payment schedules differ for the different programs (e.g. for pensions, health, 
unemployment, etc.). Further information, and data for later years, can be found in the EUROMOD country reports (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/), the 
OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives). 
1.  in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions) 
2.  after adding any standard tax free allowances, deductions or exemptions available to single employees 
3.  insurance is voluntary 
4.  averages: rates differ between municipalities and/or employers 
5.  including "Solidarity Surplus Tax" for German unification. MTR increases linearly in-between lower and middle; and middle and top tax band limits. 
6.  West Germany 
7.  including regional income taxes where applicable 
8.  including pension contributions (same tax base as income tax) 
9.  effective rate taking into account the allowance of 70% of the tax base for low incomes 
10.  all earnings are subject to the applicable rate once they exceed these threshold levels 
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Table A2. Summary of social benefits available to persons of working-age 
Social Assistance Housing Benefit2 Family Benefits3 Employment-conditional Benefits
max. amount1 disregard1
withdrawal 
rate taxable max. amount
1 withdrawal rate amount1 withdrawal rate amount1 work/income conditions withdrawal rate
Austria 52 - 100% IT: noSSC: no - - 5-7 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Belgium 53 10 for each working adult 100%
IT: no
SSC: no - - 4-13 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Denmark
90
+ housing 
allowance
9 for each 
working adult 100%
IT: yes
SSC: no 11 75%
3-4 per child; higher for 
lone parents
none
(universal payment) - - -
Finland
58
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 34 80%
5-9 per child; plus 2 per 
child for lone parents; plus 
day-care subsidy
none
(universal payment) - - -
France 49 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 20 34%
main benefit: 7 to 12 for 
second & further children; 
special benefits for young 
children
main benefit: 100% once 
income > 174-261 - - -
Germany
474
+ reasonable 
housing costs
4 for each 
working 
family 
member
75-100% IT: noSSC: no
45
(if not receiving 
social assistance)
40%
main benefit: 5-9 per child; 
child-raising allowance for 
very young children: 
additional 5-7
main benefit: none 
(universal payment);
child-raising allowance: 20-
40% once income > 62
- - -
Greece - - - - 0.5-1 per child plus additions for large families
reduced in steps for 
incomes > 65 - - -
Ireland 56
19
(only for 2nd 
earner)
100% IT: noSSC: no 53 100% 3-4 per child
none
(universal payment)
60% of family gross earnings 
exceeding 88 (higher limit for 
larger families)
couple jointly working at 
least 20 hours per week
60% (of gross family 
earnings)
Italy - - - -
3-17 per family member (also 
spouses) depending on family 
type
must work at least 3 
days per week; reduced 
benefits if working less 
than full-time
reduced in steps for 
family incomes > 73
Luxembourg 64 13 100% IT: yesSSC: reduced
6
(must receive social 
assistance)
100%
8-13 per child; plus 
education allowance for 
children aged 3-
none
(universal payment) - - -
Netherlands 49 - 100%
yes, but max. 
amount is 
shown on net 
basis
6 54% 2-7 per child none(universal payment) - - -
Portugal 59 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 4 per child
reduced to 3 per child 
once income > 71 - - -
Spain 2 for first child, 0.2 for further children 100% once income > 55 - - -
Sweden
35
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 17
33%
(disregard of 18) 4-8 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
United Kindgom 51 2-4 100% IT: noSSC: no
100% of recognised 
rent; 100% of 
council tax
65% (housing benefit); 
20% (council tax 
benefit)
3-5 per child none(universal payment)
18 + up to 13 per child + 4 if 
working > 30 hours per week; 
only entitled if >= 1 child
at least one person 
working >= 16 hours per 
week
70% of family 
income > 29
none at the national level
none at the national level
none at the national level none at the national level
see employment-conditional benefits
none at the national level
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Abbreviations: IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions. 
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Rules for social benefits can vary between regions or municipalities. Where social assistance is subject to job-search or other conditions 
(e.g. in Denmark), it is assumed that both spouses comply with the relevant requirements. All information is for families with two children. IT = income tax; SSC = social security 
contributions. Further information, and data for later years, can be found in the EUROMOD country reports (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/), the OECD Tax 
Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives). 
1.  in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions). 
2.  cash assistance for privately rented accommodation. Housing benefits may be paid through the social assistance program. In this case, they are already reflected in the social 
assistance amounts shown in this table. 
3.  in addition to family-related tax concessions shown in the companion table under income tax. Does not include any benefits available for pregnancy, childbirth, parental leave, or 
childcare benefits. 
4.  West Germany. 
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Country Primary earners Secondary earners PE tax / SE tax
Austria 0.54 0.44 1.24
Belgium 0.58 0.60 0.98
Denmark 0.56 0.54 1.04
Finland 0.61 0.47 1.32
France 0.54 0.53 1.01
Germany 0.54 0.59 0.92
Greece 0.30 0.28 1.07
Ireland 0.35 0.43 0.82
Italy 0.53 0.48 1.10
Luxembourg 0.39 0.44 0.89
Netherlands 0.50 0.47 1.08
Portugal 0.38 0.42 0
2 1.02
4 1.15
Unite 1.43
Note: The table shows marriage penalties on an annual basis for hypothetical families in 2007 Euros. The calculations are done for 
different earnings levels for the primary and secondary earner and the earnings levels refer to percentiles in the earnings distribution 
for primary and secondary earners, respectively. The marriage penalty is calculated as the change in a couple's combined (net-)tax 
liability upon separation. It is assumed that all individuals occupy rental housing. Following separation, each spouse is assumed to 
bear rental costs amounting to 50% of the costs in the married scenario. Further, each spouse retains custody of one child. 1998 
figures are converted to 2007 euros using national indices of compensation per employee. Exchange rates are, respectively, the 
irrevocable euro exchange rates (12 euro countries) and 2007 average annual exchange rates (non-euro countries: Denmark, 
Sweden, UK). 
Note: Average effective marginal tax rates for primary earners in one-earner couples and secondary earners conditional on working. 
Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model. 
Sources: EUROMOD microsimulation model, OECD Economic Outlook 82, and Danmarks Nationalbank. 
Family Income Percentiles AT BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP SW UK
PE 0 - SE 0 4905 5217 -2990 2066 5907 760 0 2224 0 8110 2443 0 0 10384 2418
PEp10 - SE 0 7510 5319 4966 7263 7306 4008 -24 7069 -1527 13281 6312 1652 -421 14126 4994
PEp10 - SEp10 4875 5684 199 2214 2440 2587 -24 4471 -437 8298 5385 94 0 2251 3336
PEp50 - SE 0 7780 5861 8184 8340 6915 3273 -145 5078 -957 9089 6190 1241 -969 14508 8075
PEp50 - SEp10 5228 6741 264 2224 1485 1913 -145 1235 -456 3201 4886 -317 -127 2251 3587
PEp50 - SE p50 0 1655 0 0 -170 -149 11 -1507 -625 -3827 961 142 0 0 -609
PEp90 - SE 0 8020 6027 8985 9621 1092 -356 0 5922 -1619 3121 8937 -999 -2122 14508 13411
PEp90 - SEp10 5969 6779 1031 3223 -3263 -1468 0 2698 -1207 -3539 7560 -2434 -320 2251 9049
PEp90 - SEp50 0 1954 1464 0 -3262 -5517 106 -1212 -1377 -7801 0 -1169 0 0 3148
PEp90 - SEp90 0 3077 0 0 -1251 -1682 287 0 -1677 -3662 0 638 0 0 -610
 
Table A3. Average marginal tax rates 
.89
Spain 0.33 0.3
Sweden 0.63 0.5
d Kingdom 0.44 0.31
 
Table A4. Annual marriage penalties in 2007 euros for families with no children, 1998 
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Figure A1. Marginal tax rates of secondary earners for couples with two children 
In percent, at selected earnings levels as a function of primary earnings (vingtiles) 
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Figure continues on next page 
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Figure A1. (cont.) 
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Note: Each figure shows the marginal tax rate of the secondary earner (SE) in percent as a function of the earnings of the primary earner (PE), depicted by vingtile group in the PE 
earnings distribution. The graphs are shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and the top decile (SEp90) 
of the SE earnings distribution. Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
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Figure A2. Participation tax rates of secondary earners for couples without children 
In percent, at selected earnings levels as a function of primary earnings (vingtiles) 
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Note: Each figure shows the participation tax rate of the SE in percent as a function of the earnings of the PE, depicted by vingtile group in the PE earnings distribution. The graphs are 
shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and the top decile (SEp90) of the SE earnings distribution. 
Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
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Figure A2. (cont.) 
